Television advertising of prescription drugs is controversial, and it remains illegal in all but two countries. Much of the opposition stems from concerns that advertising directly to consumers may ineciently distort prescribing patterns toward the advertised product. Despite the controversy surrounding the practice, its eects are not well understood. Exploiting a policy change that makes such advertising possible in the United States along with a spatial identication at the border approach, I estimate that television advertising of prescription antidepressants exhibits signicant positive spillovers on rivals' demand. I then construct and estimate a multi-stage demand model that allows advertising to be pure category expansion, pure business stealing or some of each. Estimated parameters indicate that advertising has strong market level demand eects that tend to dominate business stealing eects. Spillovers are both large and persistent. Using these estimates and a simple supply model, I explore the consequences of the positive spillovers on rm advertising choice. In a cooperative advertising campaign, simulations suggest that the co-operative would produce on average ve times as much advertising as is observed in competitive equilibrium, resulting in a 13.7 percent increase in category size and a 18.3 percent increase in category prots. * Massachusetts Institute of Technology. I thank Nancy Rose, Ernst Berndt, and Stephen Ryan for a wealth of advice throughout this project. I would also like to extend my gratitude to
Introduction
How does television advertising aect the consumer choice problem? After a consumer watches a commercial, internalizes its message and decides a product is desirable, she must take further action to obtain the product. With groceries, she must go to the supermarket. With many consumer products, a computer with internet will allow the consumer to make the purchase. With prescription drugs, the consumer must go to the physician to obtain a prescription and then to the pharmacy to purchase the drug. With many steps between the advertising incidence and purchase, at some stage of the process, the consumer might well choose a dierent product from the one advertised. This may be due to diculty in remembering advertisements, agency problems in obtaining products or simply because advertising convinces a consumer to go to a retailer, computer or physician. In short, an advertisement could aect the choice process without leading the consumer to buy the advertised product.
In this paper, I identify the existence of positive spillovers of television advertising in the market for antidepressants. Given this, I construct and estimate a demand model which allows such spillovers. To quantify the eect of spillovers on rm behavior, I conduct a supply side analysis supposing that the rms are able to jointly decide advertising, and I compare this outcome to the realized advertising outcome in the antidepressant market.
Television advertising of prescription drugs is contentious and has been condemned by many as ineciently distorting prescriptions to the advertised products. In fact, it is legal in only two countries: New Zealand and the United States. In light of the controversy, it is important to understand the impact of these advertisements. In particular, understanding spillovers is crucial to regulators, rms and econometricians. From a regulatory perspective, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) regulates the content of advertisements.
To the extent that advertising content is made more informative and less brand specic, content regulation could exacerbate spillovers. Firms may lose individual incentives to advertise as spillovers intensify. This could be either good or bad for social welfare depending on whether or not category expansion is a public good or a public bad. However, it is an important consideration for the regulator in either case. From a rm strategy perspective, understanding possible channels for revenue improvement is vital. While cooperation is often dicult to enforce and non-contractible due to antitrust laws, advertising cooperatives are precedented in other industries such as orange juice, milk and beef. Finally, from a technical perspective, failure to model spillovers in advertising can distort estimated parameters, leading to incorrect inferences about supply and demand.
Previous research incorporating advertising into demand analysis has frequently treated advertising of a product as aecting its probability of being in the choice set (Goeree 2008 ), or has incorporated advertising into a production of goodwill that enters directly into the utility function (Dube et. al. 2005) . However, such specications also typically exclude the possibility of positive spillovers of advertising onto rivals. While this eliminates the complexity of modeling behavior in the presence of possible free riding, such an exclusion may lead the researcher to miss important strategic considerations. When deciding how much to advertise, rms do not internalize the benet they provide to other rms and have an incentive to free ride on their rivals' advertising eorts. Understanding these considerations is important for marketing decision makers as well as policy makers potentially seeking to regulate advertising.
Prescription drugs in general, and antidepressants in particular, have many characteristics which facilitate positive spillovers in television advertising. First, the FDA regulates what rms can and cannot say in advertisements. While the name of the product is typically prominently displayed throughout the commercial, most of the time in each commercial is spent explaining the ailment, the mechanism of action of the drug and its side eects. When there are several therapeutic products available, those treating the same ailments tend to share common characteristics. A consumer might remember all of the things being said but forget the name of the product. Agency problems further disrupt this link. A consumer must see a doctor to get a prescription. A physician might have dierent preferences or opinions about which drugs, if any, work best for a given condition or patient. The advertisement may lead a patient to the physician, but the physician is still the ultimate arbiter of whether and what to prescribe.
My strategy for evaluating the extent of positive spillovers in advertising for antidepressants proceeds in three steps. First, I use discrete television market borders to determine whether advertising does exhibit positive spillovers onto rivals. Next, I construct and estimate a model of the antidepressant market, allowing advertising to have positive spillovers on demand of horizontally dierentiated products, a feature excluded by typical discrete choice specications. Positive spillovers are allowed, but not imposed by the model. Given the demand estimates and a model of supply, I back out the marginal costs of advertising from a model of dynamic strategic rm interaction. Finally, given estimates of the demand eects and marginal costs of advertising, I quantify the importance of free riding by re-simulating the supply model, assuming that a co-operative sets advertising for the entire industry.
Studies of Direct-to-Consumer (DTC) advertising in pharmaceuticals with varying credibility of identication strategies have suggested the possibility that cross-advertising elasticities could be positive, but results have been mixed. In particular, , , Wosinska (2002) ], nd very small estimates of advertising eects on market shares conditional on being in the market and conclude that it might be exhibiting positive spillovers, though spillovers are neither modeled nor tested. Wosinska (2005) and nd that advertising has positive spillover eects onto drug compliance and duration of treatment. Other studies nd that advertising drives consumers to the doctor (Iizuka & Jin 2004) or has class level eects (Rosenthal et. al. 2003 , Avery et. al. 2012 ), but they do not model any product level own or cross-elasticities of advertising. In work that is more closely related to this study , Berndt et. al. (1995 , Berndt et. al. ( , 1997 estimate the eect of marketing on both the size of the market and on brand shares, focusing mostly on physician detail advertising and academic journal advertising since DTC was extremely limited and unbranded at the time, and found some eects at both category and product levels. Narayanan The supply side of advertising in pharmaceuticals has been much less explored. If advertising helps rivals' demand, there might well be an incentive to invest less in advertising. Iizuka (2004) nds that as the number of competitors increases, rms advertise less, leading him to suggest the existence of a free riding problem. Ellison and Ellison (2011) nd evidence that pharmaceutical rms decrease advertising just prior to patent expiration in order to make the market smaller and deter generics from entering. The possibility of such strategic deterrence implies the existence of positive spillovers, at least from brand to generic. However, no research that I am aware of uses a supply model to quantify the magnitude of the potential positive spillover eects on advertising expenditure decisions.
Outside of the pharmaceutical literature, Sahni (2013) nds experimental evidence of positive spillovers to rivals in restaurant advertising in India. Additionally, Lewis & Nguyen (2012) and Anderson & Simester (2013) nd evidence of positive spillovers in a number of categories. While these studies are strong in identication, they do not spend much energy in studying the supply side consequences of the positive spillovers that they identify.
The contributions of this paper are threefold. First, I improve upon the literature that seeks to identify the causal eect of advertising on own and rivals' demand in pharmaceuticals by using an identication at the border approach. That is, I will identify advertising elasticities by comparing households that are very near to each other geographically but get dierent advertisements due to the way the television market borders are drawn. In addition, I exploit a 1999 policy change making television advertising possible in the United States. I show that advertising has signicant positive eects on rivals' sales, though smaller than its eects on own rm sales. Next, I construct and estimate a consumer choice model, which allows advertising to inuence the size of the category, the conditional share of each subcategory in the category, and the conditional share of each product in a subcategory. I will consider the category, the subcategory and the product levels as three separate stages of a joint physician-consumer decision making process. At each stage, I will allow for some inter-temporal inuence. Results indicate that advertising of antidepressants aects all levels of choice. The category eects are larger and more persistent over time than are business stealing eects, leading to a net positive spillover. Finally, I conduct a supply side analysis to evaluate to what extent positive spillovers suppress the incentive to advertise. I nd that a co-operative deciding all advertising expenditure levels would advertise on average four times as much as is observed in competitive equilibrium. No other research that I am aware of conducts such a supply side analysis of the provision of advertising that exhibits positive spillovers. This paper helps move us toward understanding the eects of advertising and the incentives facing the rms who provide it, and understanding both are essential to rm prot maximization and to ecient regulation.
Empirical Setting

Prescription Drugs and Advertising
Television advertising of prescription drugs did not appear in the United States until 1997. While technically not forbidden by law, advertising was required to have much more risk information included on all advertisements than is required today. This required risk information was similar to the package inserts that come with prescriptions. Reading those aloud in the context of a thirty second spot was prohibitively time consuming and costly. In the fall of 1997, the FDA issued a draft memorandum clarifying their stance on advertising risk information, allowing advertisements to air so long as they had a`fair balance' of risk information, even if abbreviated. Firms had the opportunity to submit their advertisements to the FDA for pre-approval to ensure that the`fair balance' condition was met. In 1999 the nal copy of the FDA memorandum was circulated. The rst advertisements on television for antidepressants were seen in 1999 when GlaxoSmithKline's brand, Paxil, began airing its rst campaigns. 
Antidepressants
Prescription antidepressants are indicated for treatment of major depressive disorder and dysthymia, which is a more minor version of depression. Traditionally, depression was treated with what are called tricylcic antidepressants (TCAs), which were discovered in the 1950s, but those came with signicant side eects and risks. Treatment of depression took a great leap forward in the late 1980s with the innovation of selective serotonin reuptake inhibitors (SSRIs), the rst of which was Prozac. Newer generation antidepressants are more tolerable than the older generation TCAs and allow patients to be more safely treated and with fewer side eects (Anderson 2000) . This allows easier management of antidepressant treatment by primary care physicians, and makes seeing a specialist less necessary.
Diagnosis and treatment of depression can be rather complicated, as with many mental disorders. As the class of drugs has grown, so have the number of people being treated. In 1996, the industry pulled in around $5 billion in revenue. By 2004, it was up to $13 billion. In 2004, an FDA black box warning was instituted suggesting that antidepressants might lead to an increase in suicidality among adolescents (Busch et. al 2012) . Around the same time, many widely selling molecules began to go o patent. Figure 2 shows the revenues of the antidepressant industry from 1996 through 2004. Since the discovery of Prozac, ten other brands, some with slightly dierent mechanisms, have been discovered and have entered the market. Some of those have developed extended release versions which allow patients to have fewer doses per day.
There are six main subcategories of antidepressants: the old style TCAs, Tetracylcic (TeCA), Serotonin Antagonist and Reuptake Inhibitors (SARI), Serotonin-norepinephrine Reuptake Inhibitors (SNRI), Norepinephrine Reuptake Inhibitors (NDRI) and SSRI. While the specic dierences between these are not important to this study, it is worth noting that each subcategory has somewhat dierent mechanisms, interactions and side eect proles from the others. Deciding which subcategory of antidepressant is appropriate for a given patient is largely up to the physician, and often is related to other medications the patient is taking. The decision between drugs within a subcategory might depend on what is included on the patient's insurance formulary or physician preferences. Antidepressants are characterized by a high degree of experimentation to nd a good t between treatment and patient, as well as a low compliance rate due to the many side eects (Murphy et. al. 2009 ).
Many physicians see depression as an under treated condition and some research has concluded that restricting access to antidepressants has been associated with negative health outcomes (Busch et. al. 2012) . Given this information, it is plausible that market expansive advertising could play a role in this market.
The Market for Advertising
Firms can purchase advertising space on television in two ways. First, there is an upfront market each summer where advertising agencies and rms make deals for the upcoming year of television. Advertising purchased in the upfront market cannot be returned and typically has minimal exibility in terms of timing.
Next, there is a spot market that is called the`scatter' market, where rms can purchase advertising closer to the date aired.
Additionally, there are both national and local advertisements. National advertisements are seen by everyone in the country tuned into a particular station, while local advertisements are only seen by households within a particular designated market area (DMA).
A DMA is a collection of counties, typically centered around a major city, and it is dened by AC Nielsen, a global marketing research rm. The DMA location of a county determines which local television stations that a consumer of cable or satellite dish gets with his or her subscription. In addition, those who watch television over the air, are more likely to pick up stations within their DMAs than from others. There are 210 DMAs in the United States, the largest 101 of which are included in my data. 
Advertising Data
Product level monthly advertising data at the national and Designated Market Area (DMA) level for the top 101 DMAs comes from Kantar Media. In addition to advertising expenditures, the data includes number of commercials. The unit of advertising used in this study will be expenditures per 100 capita in the viewing area. Scaling expenditures by population in the viewing area allows me to have a comparable measure of advertising volume between national and local advertising. Total advertising for a county is dened as the national advertising expenditure scaled by the national population plus the local advertising expenditure scaled by the population of the DMA.
1 Table 1 1 A possible alternative measure would be to use the number of commercials at the national level plus the number of commercials at the local level. I explored using that measure and the results were not qualitatively dierent. However, as a commercial during the evening news is likely to capture far more eyeballs than a commercial during a 1:00 AM rerun of MacGyver, using expenditures per 100 capita would seem to do a better job at measuring quality adjusted advertising than number of commercials. is higher in New York than it is in Boston, which in turn is higher than it is in Austin, suggesting that there is non-trivial variation across markets in this measure. National advertising makes up the bulk of the advertising that households see, but the local additions to the national advertising vary a great deal. The pattern is very similar in number of commercials, indicating that expenditures per capita are a reasonably comparable object across localities and national. However, as commercials are likely to be priced by reach, using expenditures per 100 capita should be a reasonably comparable way to measure reach of the ads. Figure 4 shows that national commercials and national expenditures per 100 capita are highly correlated. CMS also collects data on the average pharmacy acquisition cost for all pharmaceutical products (NADAC).
Other Data Sources
As I will not be estimating marginal production costs empirically, these average pharmacy acquisition costs may be used as an eective upper bound on marginal production costs. While there are markups from branded drugs, pharmacies are typically able to obtain generics at much lower rates, particularly when there are several generic competitors (as is the case in this market), often as low as ten cents per pill. As of 2013, all products in the sample have generic versions available. For an upper bound on the marginal cost of each drug, I use average pharmacy acquisition cost for those generic version of the product, deated to 2010 dollars using the consumer price index. In gure 5, the quantity weighted average margin in Boston is plotted versus time for the purposes of illustration. The average margin in the market rises as more popular branded antidepressants replace old generic TCAs and falls as more newer generation generics become widely prescribed.
Yearly county population and income data are drawn from the Current Population Survey (CPS).
Notable in the data is that there is both national and local advertising. Finally, own rm and rival rm advertising are negatively correlated, which could be an indicator of the positive spillovers of advertising in this setting.
Reduced Form Evidence
In this section, I explore the data to see if spillover eects exist and how they interact with own eects. This exercise has been dicult to implement in previous research, largely due to data limitations. Estimates show that rivals' and own advertising have a positive eect on sales, while rivals' advertising has a smaller eect than own advertising. In addition, the cross partials indicate that rivals' advertising makes own advertising less eective, but own advertising has a larger negative eect on the marginal own advertisement due to decreasing returns to scale.
In particular, I model sales of quantities Q of product j in time t for market m as a function of own advertising, a own , and advertising of rivals, a cross :
This provides insight on whether rivals' advertisements help or hurt own demand, the nature of decreasing returns to scale, and persistence in advertising eects.
Empirical Identication Strategy -Border Strategy
The endogeneity of advertising and the absence of obvious instruments pose challenges to causal identication of the eect of advertising on demand. I identify the eects of television advertising by taking advantage of the discrete nature of local advertising markets. That is, two households which are directly across the television market border from one another will see dierent advertisements despite being otherwise very similar households. I take advantage of this comparison.
Advertising is purchased both nationally and locally. The level of total advertising that a household gets to its television is determined by the Designated Market Area (DMA) that the household's county belongs to, as dened by AC Nielsen. Nielsen places counties into markets by predicting which local stations the households will be most interested in. As such, DMAs tend to be centered at metropolitan areas. A map of all of the DMAs included in the advertising data is presented in gure 6.
To get an idea of how advertising is distributed across the country, consider the example of the Cleveland and Columbus DMAs. The data contain 153 such borders. The map of all of the counties included in this border sample is presented in gure 8. Each of these borders will be considered a separate experiment, with the magnitude of the treatment determined by the advertising in each DMA at a given time. Only the counties bordering each other will serve as controls for each other to partial out any local eects that may be increasing or decreasing for both sides of the border.
To estimate the eects of advertising in this experiment, I will use a modied dierence-in-dierences estimator. My identication assumption is that along the border of two DMAs, any dierential trends in demand between the two sides of the DMA border stem from dierences in advertising. In particular, I use panel data with xed eects. Border-time xed eects will ensure that the common trend assumption is only enforced locally at the border between two DMAs, allowing for spatial heterogeneity. Border-DMA xed eects will allow systematically dierent demand levels across the border. I will also include a lagged dependent variable to get at the dynamic eects of advertising. Consider the log of quantity log(Q jbmt ), at the 2 from http://www.dishuser.com/TVMarkets/Maps/ohio.gif product-border-DMA-month level. Advertising, a jmt , as mentioned before lives at the product-DMA-month level and aects log(Q jbmt ) through some function f :
Each product-border pair will constitute an experiment with border-markets being treatment groups. My xed eects specication is:
where the subscripts j and b indicate which experiment is being considered (product and border specic), α jbq is a time eect which is used to control the experiment, which in this case will be a quarter xed eect, α jbm is a treatment group xed eect, and f (a jmt ) is the magnitude of the treatment. The magnitude of the treatment is zero everywhere prior to 1999, as the FDA memo had not yet gone into eect. To investigate persistence in demand, a lagged dependent variable is also included.
For further intuition, again consider the Cleveland-Columbus example and the case of Zoloft advertisements.
In the equation above, log(Q jbmt ) is log number of prescriptions of Zoloft in the Cleveland-Columbus border, indexed by month and which side of the border it is on. The magnitude of the treatment, f (a jmt ) is a function of the Zoloft's advertising in each market. The time eect, α jbq , is a common quarter xed eect between the Cleveland and Columbus sides of this border and is used to subtract out contemporaneous macro eects.
The xed eect, α jbm , allows the dierent sides of the border to have systematically dierent levels in the outcome.
For this strategy to be valid, the Cleveland and Columbus sides of the border may dier by a xed level, but they must have common trends absent advertising dierences. Is this plausible? These counties are bordering, so they are very similar in geography. Both are suciently far from their central cities. The counties on the Cleveland side are only slightly closer to Cleveland than they are to Columbus and vice versa.
Also worth noting is that if Columbus always had a high, constant level of advertising and Cleveland always had a low, constant level of advertising, this estimation strategy would have no power to identify the eects of interest, as the border-DMA xed eect would subtract out this variation, even though that advertising in Columbus might well have had an eect. Since prior to 1997, no DMAs had any advertising, there will be at least some variation in each experiment over time.
Potential Threats to the Border Strategy
One potential worry is that there would be little variation after partialling out the xed eects. This would be the case if too much of the advertising were national and not enough were local. should be suciently large that any bias will be minimal.
Additionally, we might be concerned about measurement error. There are a two main possibilities that could lead to measurement error and biased estimates:
1. Consumers watch advertisements in one DMA, but drive across the border to see their physicians.
2. Consumer watch advertisements in one DMA, but drive towards the center of the DMA to a county not included in the border sample to see their physicians.
Both of these scenarios would lead me to understate the eect of the advertisements. To the extent that we think that these biases are present, we can look at my estimates as lower bounds on the true parameters.
3
Omitted variables bias could also be a source of bias. Prices and detailing are omitted from this estimation.
As prices tend not to vary geographically due to a very low transport cost and ease of obtaining drugs through the mail, prices are absorbed in the product-border-time xed eect. Detailing is observed in my data, but only at the national product-month level. Any national average eects of detailing are also controlled for 3 However, the Dartmouth Institute has drawn primary care commuting zones which describe how far Medicare patients travel to see their physicians. It is very rare for a commuting zone to cross DMA lines-only about 1% of primary care commuting zones cross DMA borders at all, and those that do tend to be predominantly in only one DMA. This should minimize the measurement error worry. Further explanation of the Dartmouth Institute commuting zones is provided in the appendix.
by the product-border-time eect. Where there might be trouble, however, is if rms strategically raise (or lower) detailing at the product-market-time level in exactly the same places where DTC to take advantage of any complementarities or substitutabilities.
Two points help address the concern of omitted variables. First, using the border strategy, for such detailing to be a problem, rms would have to instruct detailers to stop detailing increases (decreases) exactly at the borders of the television market areas, which seems unlikely. Next, there is a literature (Manchanda et. al. 2004 ) suggesting that detailing is largely determined by practice size, which is eectively controlled for in the treatment group xed eects. Finally, national detailing is much more stable over time than is national television advertising. As a robustness check, I have taken the national detailing data and assumed it was distributed across DMAs in exactly the same proportions as DTC advertising. This attribution of detailing constitutes a`worst case scenario' in terms of how much detailing would bias any estimates of the eects of DTC. Doing this does not signicantly change the results. This robustness check is provided in the appendix.
Finally, the identifying assumption of dierence-in-dierences could be violated.
It could be that the dierence-in-dierences model fails the parallel trends assumption, invalidating the dierence-in-dierences design. To address this concern, I have conducted a placebo test. Using data on DMA level television advertising of over-the-counter sleep aids as a placebo treatment, I nd no economically signicant eects.
Details for this robustness check are in the appendix.
Why the border strategy?
A more conventional identication strategy in the discrete choice literature is to use an instrumental variables approach, as in Berry, Levinsohn and Pakes (1995), henceforth BLP. The main identifying assumption for the validity of the BLP instruments is that the characteristics of competing products within a market are exogenous, thus the changing competitive structure of the market may be used as a supply side instrument for demand side choice variables. In the market for prescription drugs, entry happens in all markets simultaneously by all products, thus use of the BLP instruments would eliminate any spatial variation, which is a main attribute of the data I am using. Furthermore, it might be unreasonable to think that competitor characteristics are exogenous in this setting. It stands to reason that as consumers demand more antidepressants with fewer of some kind of side eects that rms might well focus research and development on that kind of product. I am more comfortable with assumptions required by the border strategy in addition to the fact that it allows me to use the spatial variation in the data.
Results
Using the identication strategy at the border outlined, the estimating equation including xed eects becomes: (2) where α jbq is a product-border-quarter xed eect and α jbd is a product-border-DMA xed eect. The α jbq eect will sweep out all variation that is not between two areas that are on opposite sides of a DMA border.
Partialing these xed eects out makes the identifying variation within product j local advertising that is over and above the average on its side d of the border b and over and above the average local advertising of product j in time period t in all counties on that either side of border b.
Results of the above regression are provided in table 2. Most notable is that both rivals' and own advertising has a positive and signicant eect on demand. Rivals' advertising hits decreasing returns to scale more slowly than does own advertising. Also, the cross partial indicates that rivals' advertising works a rm down its marginal revenue curve with respect to advertising, but not as much as own advertising does. Finally, there is evidence of persistence, though the persistence parameter is not especially large. This is consistent with the idea that there is much experimentation to nd the correct t between patient and treatment in the depression space. If the category expansive eect of advertising is more persistent, it will be another potential avenue for rms to under-invest relative to a co-operative. consumer arrives at her desired end product through a sequence of choice problems. First, the consumer chooses between entering the category (inside option) and the outside option. If she chooses to enter the category, she chooses which subcategory of product she wants. Finally, given her choice of subcategory, she chooses which product to purchase. This process can be extended, in principle, to have any number of stages.
In the specic case of prescription antidepressants, this is plausible. A consumer rst decides whether she has a problem with depression, goes to the physician and together with the physician, determines which class of drugs would be most suitable (perhaps considering interactions with other drugs taken) and which product in particular is the best choice (perhaps having to do with what is on her formulary).
I dene`utility' u of consuming the inside option, as a function of total advertising stock as well as other market level factors:
In this specication, l denotes the inside option versus outside option, m denotes market and t denotes time period. I dene Γ 1 as an increasing function of A lmt , total advertising stock of all inside option products in market m at time t, ξ lt is a time specic taste for the inside option, ξ lm is a market specic taste for the inside option, and X lmt are market-time characteristics.
For the next stage, I dene the relative utility v l of subcategory n conditional upon the choice of the inside option as a function of the total advertising stock in subcategory n, A nmt , as well as other subcategorymarket-time level factors:
Finally, relative utility w n of product j conditional upon the choice of subcategory n, is dened as a function of advertising stock of product j, A jmt , and other product-market-time level factors:
Dynamics enter the model through advertising carry-over. That is, a consumer may remember an advertisement from a previous period, and that advertisement may aect current period demand. In general, advertising stock is a function of current period advertising (measured in expenditure per 100 capita) in choice stage s, a s , where s ∈ {l, n, j}, last period's advertising stock, A sm,t−1 and a parameter governing depreciation over time, λ s .
I set each disturbance term, , to be iid extreme value type I. Given the logit errors, I compute a closed form solution for shares. The unconditional share of product j in subcategory n is a product of conditional shares, where market and time subscripts have been suppressed:
Those conditional shares take logit form:
I note here that the equations at each level are independent of each other. I allow each level to have a dierent persistence λ s , and dierent eects of advertising, γ. I also note that while I call the latent variables at each level`utilities', it is not essential to interpret them literally as such. In this paper, I will not be computing consumer welfare, and it is likely that the latent variables contain a combination of patient and physician utility, information and persuasion. The purpose of the choice model is to guide the rm decision problem.
While it is possible that these parameters could be related across levels by some kind of summing up identity (as they would if each of the equations were only utility and consumers maximized utility), I do not restrict them to be, as discovering the relative magnitudes of advertising eects at each level is a main question of this paper.
For intuition, consider what happens if a single product, Zoloft, raises advertising in a market while everything else remains constant. That advertisement may have three eects. First, it may raise the probability that a consumer purchases any antidepressant. That eect is expressed through the top level equation, increasing a lmt , which increases A lmt which then in turn increases Γ 1 (A lmt ). Next, the information in the advertisement may push the consumer towards the subcategory of antidepressants that Zoloft is in over another, as the commercials often contain information about mechanisms and side eects, which are highly correlated within subcategory. The Zoloft advertisement increases a nmt , which increases A nmt , which in turn increases Γ 2 (A nmt ). The marginal revenue will depend on the shape of the curve and the amount of advertising done by other products in the same subcategory. Finally, the advertisement may have a pure business stealing eect. By increasing a jmt , A jmt and Γ 3 (A jmt ) increase to take share away from other products within the subcategory.
Derivatives and Elasticities
Given product shares in equation (4) and the logit structure, we can get the derivative of s j which is in subcategory n with respect to new advertising, a k , of product k which is in subcategory n by using the chain rule and the typical logit derivatives:
solving this out using our specication on shares, we get derivatives,
and advertising elasticities equal to,
From these equations, we can see that rm benets from own advertising may ow through expansion of the category, as is denoted by the term s j is suciently large or vice versa. What is restricted is that a rm's own advertisements may not help another rm more than it helps itself in elasticity terms. In the most extreme scenario, it is pure category expansion and helps all rms equally. Whether advertising provides positive or negative spillovers depends on the relative strength of the market expansion and the business stealing channels and is a result of estimation rather than an assumption of the model. Notable is that through the category expansion channel, rivals' advertising moves a rm's marginal revenue with respect to advertising downward. However own advertising must move a rm's residual marginal revenue curve even further downward, as there are decreasing returns at the conditional share level as well. Assuming that the eect of advertising is positive at all levels, the primary eect of own advertising is stronger than that of rivals' advertising and decreasing returns to own advertising are more severe than decreasing returns to rival advertising. This is a testable implication of the model.
Supply
Firm free riding may be an optimal strategy in a game with positive spillovers. Mixed strategy equilibria may be an equilibrium in a specic game with a xed cost to advertising each period. To investigate the incentives generated by the demand problem above, I assume that rms play a simultaneous game, choosing advertising each period while taking into account expectations of rival behavior and the dynamic eects of advertising. This enables me to analyze the magnitude of potential under-provision levels on average generated by positive spillovers.
The Firm's Problem
A forward looking rm maximizes a discounted stream of future prots with respect to advertising. Suppose advertising has a constant marginal cost k jm , the market size is µ m , prices are p j , marginal production costs are mc j and the discount rate is β. Further, suppose the exogenously given set of products that a rm f has in the market is denoted by Φ f and the full set of products in the market is denoted by ∪ f Φ f .
Per period prot for the rm will be a function of advertising stock of all products, {A jmt } j∈Φ , captured in the vector A mt , which is a function of the vector of current advertising for all products, a mt , advertising stocks in the previous period A m,t−1 , the persistence parameters, λ j ,λ n ,andλ I , and the product-market-time specic constant marginal cost of advertising, k jmt :
The rm's problem is to maximize the stream of future prots for all products in its portfolio:
Which may be written as the recursive function,
As long as the composition of the advertising stock function with the response function Γ are concave in advertising, the problem has a well behaved optimum.
Other Choice Variables
Other choice variables are excluded from my model for reasons of expositional clarity and data limitation.
Prices are observed only at the product-quarter level and detailing only at the product-month (national aggregate) level. While it is indeed conceivable that rms would maximize prot jointly with respect to both price and advertising, the purpose of this study is to isolate the advertising decision. In many settings this may not be possible. However, in the pharmaceutical market that I study, the institutional detail of insurance as an intermediary makes pricing largely decided by a collection of bilateral negotiations between the rm, insurance companies and health care providers. The resulting prices observed in the data are highly persistent over time and show no correlation with observed advertising. As such, I will view the pricing decision as orthogonal to the DTC decision, conditional on product-market and product-time xed eects. Under this assumption, there will be no bias in the estimation of the eects of DTC rising from omitting price from the estimation. A discussion of pricing in this market as well as the analysis showing that it is not correlated with advertising is available in Appendix A. detailing. This eect is controlled for in the product-market xed eects. Indeed, when looking at the time series of national detailing for a product, it appears much more stable over time than DTC. However, we might still be worried about strategic detailing. I will do robustness checks, making assumptions about the spatial distribution of detailing and nd that it is unable to explain the estimated eects.
Omission of pricing and detailing may still aect some conclusions in counterfactual simulations and estimations and discussion of those concerns will be explored in those sections. 4 Without including price in the analysis, I will not be estimating a price elasticity. As such, the computation of optimal advertising will be a bit dierent in spirit than the classic Dorfman-Steiner (1954) problem which suggests that the advertising to sales ratio should equal to the advertising elasticity to price elasticity ratio. This theorem was modied to allow for dynamic advertising in Nerlove and Arrow (1962) . Neither of these formulations considers positive spillover eects, and free riding incentives may make these policies sub-optimal.
Specifying advertising stock as a concave function of each period's advertising allows the rm's problem to have a well behaved optimum. Other functional forms were explored and none changed the results in any signicant way.
The advertising stock enters into the utility specication linearly at each level.
I account for all product characteristics other than advertising with a rich set of xed eects, as the only pieces of data that vary at the choice level, DMA and time levels are shares and advertising.
Substituting equations (17) and (18) into equations (1)- (3), for the market level l obtain:
The conditional utilities for the subcategory and product levels are dened analogously. From here, it is notable that current period advertising enters the utility function in a concave manner, so the rm maximization problem is well behaved.
Transforming to a Linear Problem
Following Berry (1994) , at each level of the problem, I specify an`outside good', take the log of the market share and subtract from it the log of the outside option share. This results in a linear form.
At the category level the outside good is naturally dened as the population not lling a prescription for an antidepressant in month t in market m:
At the subcategory level, the outside good will be dened as the subcategory of older style TCA antidepressants. The share of a subcategory conditional on being in the inside option follows:
At the product level, the outside option in each nest will be the set of all products that never advertise on television. The product share equation conditional on already having chosen subcategory n is:
Now, using these to solve for inside option shares shares in time t − 1, and substituting that back into the expression for time t shares yields, log(s lmt ) − log(s 0mt ) = λ l (log(s lm,t−1 ) − log(s 0m,t−1 )) + γ 1 log(1 + a lmt ) + θ lt + θ lm (23) where
is a inside option-time specic taste or quality parameter. and θ lm = ξ lm − λ l ξ lm (25) is the category-market specic taste parameter. Equation (23) is precisely a lagged dependent variable with xed eects specication as described above, making possible the use of the border identication strategy. Similarly, subcategory and product level share equations may be specied as: log(s nmt|l ) − log(s 0mt|l ) = λ n (log(s nm,t−1|l ) − log(s 0m,t−1|l )) + γ 2 log(1 + a nmt ) + θ nt + θ nm (26) log(s jmt|n ) − log(s 0mt|n ) = λ p (log(s jm,t−1|n ) − log(s jm,t−1|n )) + γ 3 log(1 + a jmt ) + θ jt + θ jm (27) 
Identication and Estimation Strategy
Since the share equations have been transformed to a linear form, estimation may be done by OLS. A notable problem in estimating this equation is that advertising is a rm choice variable determined in equilibrium and is thus endogenous. As such, I will take advantage of the discrete nature of DMAs to make use of spatial variation as described in section (3).
In particular, I specify the estimation equation as:
where α bq is a border-time xed eect and α bm is a border, DMA xed eect. Partialling these xed eects out makes the identifying variation at the market level the total advertising in market m that is over and above the average on its side d of the border b and over and above the average local total advertising in quarter q in all counties on that either side of border b. The xed eects will also control for the product quality terms θ t and θ m . I identify the eects at the other two levels similarly. In the subcategory level, I include xed eects α nbq and α nbm and at the product level, I include xed eects α jbq and α jbm . Identifying variation will come at the subcategory level from total subcategory advertising that is above and beyond the historical advertising in its market and above the border average in the current time period. At the product level, identifying variation will be advertising for product j that is above and beyond advertising for product j on the border in quarter q and above and beyond the average over all time in market m. No between product variation in advertising will be used to identify the advertising parameter. Table 3 has variable denitions and summary statistics for those variables that will enter the estimation.
Demand Results
Eects at Each Level
Results are presented in Table 4 . The eect of advertising stock on demand at each stage of the decision is positive. The strongest eects are at the category level, deciding between inside and outside option and at the product business stealing level. Eects at the subcategory level are not signicant, but it is notable that there is only advertising in two subcategories, with most of the advertising happening in the SSRI subcategory.
The small and insignicant eect at the subcategory level is not surprising, as it seems unlikely that patients would have good information about what separates the subcategories. Table 5 
Persistence
Persistence is highest at the category level-that is getting someone into consuming antidepressants at all.
The persistence parameter of 0.68 implies that 90% of the eect dissipates within six months. Meanwhile, the 0.33 persistence parameter on the bottom level implies that 90% of the business stealing eect of an advertisement dissipates within only two months. This makes advertising in the long run more of a category expansion than a business stealing tool. This is consistent with the common wisdom that antidepressants are subject to a high degree of experimentation. If a patient tries one and nds the side eects unbearable, she might well switch to another one rather than quitting altogether. It is also consistent with a limited memory view of advertising. Since advertising for pharmaceuticals on television usually contain a lot of information about the condition, the mechanisms of action and the side eects and these characteristics are highly correlated within category, a consumer might well remember seeing an advertisement about depression without remembering which brand was advertised. This high persistence at the category level relative to the product level is another source for potential underinvestment in advertising relative to a co-operative. 6 Supply and Counterfactual
Supply Implications of Positive Spillovers
The demand results above imply that the incentive to invest in advertising is dampened by positive spillovers for two reasons. First, advertising provides benets to rival rms which are not internalized by the advertising rm. Second, rival advertising lessens the incentive to advertise through the incentivize to free riding on the eorts of rivals.
Internalization
To further illustrate the eects of advertising over time on rivals, consider an impulse response graph in gure (10) . The purpose of this graph is to follow the eect of a marginal dollar per 100 capita spent by Zoloft in January of 2002 on both Zoloft and total market prescriptions for the subsequent year. The top downward sloping curve is the marginal eect of Zoloft advertising on total market prescriptions, while the bottom downward sloping curve is the marginal eect on Zoloft prescriptions. The upward sloping dashed line is the ratio of the total market eect to the Zoloft eect. A marginal dollar per 100 capita of Zoloft advertising would lead to a contemporaneous increase of about 70,000 antidepressant commercials, only about 20,000 of which would be Zoloft. Further, as we follow that eect through time, the eect on the total market is more persistent, and the marginal eect of Zoloft advertising goes more and more to other products. There is a large contemporaneous positive spillover that intensies through time. Zoloft has no incentive to internalize the benets it bestows upon other rms, and thus will under invest in advertising relative to a co-operative controlling advertising in the whole market.
Free Riding
To illustrate the free riding incentive, I consider three marginal revenue curves and a horizontal marginal cost curve in gure (11) given the demand parameters estimated in the previous section, but for a single point in time and for a single product. In the gure, I consider the perspective of Zoloft in January 2002 in the Boston DMA.
The top curve is the marginal revenue for Zoloft if all competitors set advertising equal to zero. Notably far below that curve, the middle curve is the marginal revenue curve of Zoloft if competitors combine to advertise $3 per 100 capita, which is about the average competitor advertising Zoloft sees in the Boston DMA during the time that it advertises. Finally, the lowest curve depicts the marginal revenue with respect to advertising of Zoloft when its competitors advertise $10 per 100 capita, about the maximum it ever faces from competitors in the Boston market. Notable from the curves is that the marginal revenue curve of Zoloft takes a signicant hit as its competitors advertise more. In fact, when competitors advertise up to $10 per 100 capita, it is almost not worthwhile for Zoloft to advertise at all. There is a clear incentive for Zoloft to free ride as competitors advertise more and more.
In the next subsection, I will more systematically explore these incentives for our realized antidepressant market.
Cost Computation
Given the demand estimation above, I can solve for the marginal costs associated with advertising implied by the outlined supply model. In spirit, this means that I am assuming that rms are behaving optimally, computing marginal revenues in each market in each month for each product given the expected behavior of rivals, demand estimates and price and production cost and setting that equal to marginal costs. While at rst blush, it may seem as though the marginal cost of one dollar of advertising should be one dollar, it is possible that there are opportunity costs to rms to advertising. They could have other product classes to advertise and limited advertising budgets set within the organization. They could have concerns about the public or regulator perception of advertising drugs too much (Ellison and Wolfram 2008) . As in Ellison and Ellison (2011), they may be strategically trying to deter entry by making the market seem small. In principle, they could also have other marginal benets to advertising. There may be cross class spillovers.
As such, I will allow the`marginal cost' of advertising one dollar to be either more or less than one dollar.
Since not all rms advertise in all markets and in all months, I will only be able to bound costs below where rms do not advertise.
Summaries of estimated marginal costs are presented in table 6 for each product.
While the marginal cost of one dollar of advertising is consistently more than one, typically centered around four, it varies across product and market. These costs will be used to compute the counterfactual of cooperative advertising.
Pulsing Strategies
As is noted by Dube et. al. (2005) and is evident from the gures of observed advertising, rm advertising is often highly variable and unpredictable. While the model of Dube et. al. rationalizes the spikes and zeros in advertising with an advertising stock function that is s-shaped in current advertising advertising, I rationalize those spikes and zeros by changes in costs over time. Firms might plausibly have varying opportunity costs over time and markets due to portfolio changes or organizational concerns.
It is possible that the supply side game could generate equilibria with entry into advertising in mixed strategies, if for example there were xed costs to advertising each period, which are not specied in this model. However, as the explanation of pulsing is not the main focus of this paper, details of such possibilities will be left to future research.
Counterfactual Assumptions
Given the positive spillovers of advertising, we should expect that the incentive to invest in advertising is lessened by both a failure to internalize the benets of advertising on rivals and by an incentive to free ride.
As such, I will consider a counterfactual scenario whereby the entire market is allowed to set advertising in a single optimization problem, thereby taking away strategic considerations. For such a scenario to work, cooperation would need to be not only allowed, but enforced in some way. Antidepressants (and other pharmaceutical products) might be able to cooperate similarly through non-prot organizations called patient advocacy groups. Such groups are focused on educated patients on specic diseases and treatments.
The specic mission of these types of organizations is to educate patients on how, when and why to seek treatment for various health care needs. Some examples of these types of organizations are the American Cancer Society, the Alzheimer's Association and the Depression and Bipolar Support Alliance. While they do not tend to advertise on television currently, they might be an ideal facilitator for category level advertising of antidepressants. As many physicians see depression as an undertreated condition, commercials that encouraged patients to seek their physicians' advice if they encounter the symptoms of depression might be allowed by regulators. The ability to contract on coordination would allow rms to overcome the free riding problem and provide advertising, even without a brand level component.
For the purposes of the counterfactual, assume that the advertising rms in the antidepressant market cooperate to make a common non-branded category advertisement for antidepressants, facilitated by a patient advocacy group. The eect of those advertisements is equal to the category level eect of the branded advertisements estimated above.
The co-operative solves equation (29) in each month and in each market, taking as given the computed marginal costs of advertising each product from the previous section. I assume that the marginal co-operative advertisement has cost equal to the average of the computed marginal costs of each product, weighted by the amount those products advertise in a given period. I also assume that the co-operative can forcast margins and populations in future periods.
Notably missing from this rm problem is the ability for each rm to readjust pricing and detailing with the co-operative advertising decisions, as pricing and detailing are not included in the model. As mentioned previously, prices are uncorrelated with levels of DTC in the observed world for a given drug over time. There is little reason to suspect that they would change in the counterfactual. This is because most price exibility happens in negotiations with managed care organizations which were less prevalent in the time of this sample and those negotiations happen infrequently and in a disjointed way from the advertising decision. So while DTC may respond to markups in the model, prices do not respond to DTC conditional on product-market and market-time eeects.
Detailing, on the other hand, could be more troublesome. If detailing were mainly a business stealing device, as is suggested in Narayan et. al. (2004), it would be complementary to co-operative DTC. A rm would be happy for the co-operative to make the market large and it would then try to compete over brand share in detailing space. Anticipating this, the co-operative would shade down its advertising, anticipating that prots would be competed away with detailing.
If detailing were, alternatively, also mainly category expansive, it would be a substitute for DTC. In response to the DTC, rms would be glad to reduce detailing and let the co-operative foot the bill for market expansion.
The co-operative would anticipate this and shade up its advertising. Conversations with physicians seem to indicate that they are being detailed about as much as they possibly can. Even if a rm wants to greatly ramp up detailing, it is unlikely that they will be able to if for no other reason than the physician only has so many hours in the day. If physicians are already satiated with detailing, the potential equilibrium eect of competing away all market expansion with further detailing would not be present.
Also worth noting, since in the observed world rms under invest in advertising, the counterfactual results
in some values of advertising that are not observed in the sample. Since we only estimate the demand curve for values of advertising within the sample, the out-of-sample specic numbers are driven by the assumed functional form of the advertising eect in the model. 5 
Advertising
As the business stealing incentive grows, observed total advertising is expected to increase relative to the counterfactual advertising. As the business stealing incentive dwindles, the free riding incentive associated with the positive spillovers should lead to lower observed advertising relative to the co-operative's ideal.
I assume that the co-operative can set a number of non-branded co-operative advertisements that will have the market level eects and persistence estimated in the demand section. It will be able to do so at the average cost of advertising across all products in that market and period, with the restriction that the marginal cost of advertising one dollar may not go below one dollar plus the industry standard 15% agency fee. The co-operative assumes stationarity of the optimization problem and maximizes discounted future prots in each month. Generics are assumed to have zero margin. (14) and (15) are the same as Figures (12) and (13) except that they assume that the marginal cost of advertising one dollar must be exactly one dollar plus the 15% agency fee.
Notably, the co-operative maintains signicantly higher advertising over time than is the observed outcome.
On average, the co-operative advertises ve times as much as the competitive industry. The positive spillovers of advertising seem to be generating a free riding problem for the industry. The exact numbers are coming from extrapolation on the functional form, as they are often out of sample from what is estimated. Also, where the dierence between counterfactual and observed advertising is low, computed marginal costs are very high. Where the dierence is large, the computed marginal costs are low. If we assume that true costs of advertising a dollar in the co-operative advertising world do not exceed unity, dierences are persistently much higher, with counterfactual advertising on the order of ten times observed advertising.
Quantities and Prots
In the co-operative, the greater advertising leads to an increase in shares of the inside option by 13.7% and an increase in total industry prot of 18.3% on average. Those averages over time are plotted in gures (16) and (17).
Discussion
While market expansion and increasing prots in the counterfactual would be viewed as welfare increasing in many consumer goods markets, there are a few reasons for us to take caution in the antidepressant market or prescription pharmaceutical markets more generally. First, many prescriptions are covered by insurance.
While many people are getting prescribed and incurring minimal if any cost, the system is still paying out the marked price, which is quite high. It is possible that the new prescriptions are not justied by the societal cost. However, as many physicians see depression as an under treated condition, the total welfare benets could also be very high. Second, if I have missed important price or detailing complementarities, it might be the case that all increased prots are competed away after the co-operative sets the higher advertising. If this is the case, the welfare eect is also ambiguous. However, as prices are not correlated with advertising expenditures conditional on product eects and detailing might well have reached satiation, this concern might not be very large.
The actual net social welfare eect, while interesting, is not identied in this study and is certainly worthy of further research. Category expansion is typically thought of as consumer welfare improving, as consumers would not purchase something for which the costs exceeded the benet. However, in health care, many levels of agency mask the costs and benets of treatments. As such, I am remaining agnostic on consumer welfare.
Conclusions
Using data from the antidepressant market and an identication strategy taking advantage of both policy and spatial discontinuities, I nd that television advertising has signicant positive spillovers. I construct and estimate a model to systematically explore this fact and its implications on the supply decisions of rms. In particular, I nd that the spillovers induce a commons problem whereby observed advertising is signicantly lower than the optimal strategy that a co-operative would set if it controlled the entire market.
A co-operative would set advertising ve times as high as is observed in equilibrium and would increase industry shares by 13.7% and prots by 18.3%.
These ndings also speak to some of the controversy surrounding the practice of advertising pharmaceuticals on television. Contrary to some of the criticism, this type of advertising drives consumers into the market and helps all products in the category, including the low cost generics. It is the proverbial rising tide that lifts all ships. While there is a brand eect, its eect is short lived while the category expansion eect is persistent. Especially for conditions that are seen as under treated, this type of advertising could be benecial.
These ndings are potentially relevant to rms, regulators, econometricians and marketers. Firms might be able to realize gains from cooperation that might be allowed by regulators. In the absence cooperation, it is important for rms to properly take account of spillovers when deciding advertising policy. Regulators should take into account that content regulation might reduce or eliminate the rms' incentives to advertise. LOGDT C : log of one plus dtc expenditures per 100 capita
All are dened at the experiment-DMA-month level Below is the regression of television commercials on prices. As can be seen the point estimate is very small and insignicant with respect to both own and cross advertising. Just for perspective, the average unit price of a branded drug is about $3.60 over the course of the sample and the average DTC per capita of those with a price decrease of $0.03. This is very small economically. Also interesting is that just a time trend, a product xed eect and a dummy for patent expiration can explain prices with R squared bigger than 0.99.
Prices seem quite sticky, especially relative to advertising in this market.
A.2 Detailing
To address the potential omitted variables bias problem in detailing, I assumed that the observed national detailing was geographically distributed in exactly the same way as television advertising. That is, I computed a DMA fraction of television advertising as the expenditures per capita divided by the sum over all markets of the expenditures per capita. As detailing and television advertising are, in general, positively correlated, I multiplied that fraction by national detailing totals to get a`worst case scenario' to see how much detailing could possibly aect the estimated eect of television advertising. If detailing and television advertising were negatively correlated, I would want to assume detailing was inversely distributed to this.
The results of this`worst case scenario' are presented in Table 8 . None of the estimates on television advertising are statistically distinguishable from the baseline estimation. I will exercise caution in interpreting the coecients on detailing, as they are not the actual detailing numbers at dierent localities.
Appendix B -Placebo Test
With a dierence-in-dierences model, the assumption of parallel trends in the outcome variable absent the treatment is required for a valid estimation. One way to assess the validity of this assumption is through the use of a placebo test. In this case, I will use advertising for over-the-counter (OTC) sleep aids as a placebo treatment. This is an ideal placebo for two reasons: rst, it varies at the same level as antidepressant advertising-at the DMA month. Next, OTC sleep aids need not be prescribed by a physician, so we should not expect a going to the doctor eect of advertising to be present in OTC advertising. I will use the same identication strategy, but I will also include OTC sleep aid advertising as a treatment. The results are below. None of the coecients on OTC sleep aid advertising is statistically signicant at the 5% level or economically important at any level.
Appendix C -Alternative Sample Selection
One might worry that the eect of advertising in the border sample counties diers systematically from the non-border counties or that the eect of advertising in rural areas would be much dierent than the eect of advertising in urban areas. To think about these concerns, I have repeated the analysis with several It seems the less urban areas show very similar results to the full border sample. The category and product level eects are larger, but not signicantly dierent from the full sample of borders.
C.1.2 Only the Urban Border Counties
It seems the eects of advertising are a bit smaller in the more urban areas, except at the nest level. However, it seems more likely that the identifying assumption might fail in the more urban areas, as the borders are much closer to the central cities than in the more rural borders. Next, I assume that the border sample approach is not necessary and that advertising may be viewed as predetermined with respect to demand shocks. This might be plausible since a large fraction of television advertising in the pharmaceutical market is purchased in the upfront market. Using a dierence-in-dierences approach with a lagged dependent variable and a common trend for all DMAs, I estimate the model. The point estimates for the eects of advertising are not statistically dierent from those in the border approach.
However, the persistence parameters are a bit larger. If we believe these persistence parameters over the ones estimated in the border approach, the spillover problem will be even larger than was estimated. I continue to prefer the border approach, as the assumptions of common trends among similar geographies is more plausible than a nationally common trend. In addition, it gives more modest estimates of the size of the spillover, working against, my main nding of spillover eects.
Appendix D -Primary Care Service Areas all. Of those that do cross DMA borders, they do so only minimally. That is, the DMA holding the majority of a PCSA which crosses a border on average contains 97% of that PCSA. As such, measurement error bias should be minimal.
